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Structured Abstract: 
 
Purpose: This paper investigates two research questions: Is ICS disclosure, as a monitoring 
mechanism, associated with the characteristics of the board of directors, particularly the audit 
committee as the main board committee devoted to the effectiveness of ICS? Does the regulatory 
environment, particularly the regulation on ICS disclosure as an external governance/monitoring 
mechanism play a role in shaping the relationship between board monitoring and ICS disclosure 
and, if so, how?  
Design/methodology/approach: We study the ICS disclosure of 149 companies listed in four 
European financial markets (London, Paris, Frankfurt, and Milan), each with its own regulations 
about ICS disclosure, during a six-year period (2003–2008). 
Findings: Our findings support an inverse association between the extent of ICS disclosure and our 
proxies for board monitoring. We also find a statistically significant negative relationship between 
board monitoring and substantial ICS disclosure but no relationship between board monitoring and 
formal ICS disclosure. Our evidence also shows that the regulatory environment moderates the 
relationship between board monitoring and ICS disclosure by introducing trade-offs among 
monitoring mechanisms. 
Originality/value: We propose a framework for the analysis of ICS disclosure that considers the 
importance of the content of ICS disclosure, rather than its extent. Through this framework, 
researchers, practitioners, and standard-setters can separate merely formal, uninformative disclosure 
(boilerplate information) on the elements of the ICS from substantial disclosure regarding its 
functioning (monitoring function). We also provide evidence that the relationship between board 
monitoring and ICS disclosure varies with the content of the information communicated, thus 
offering guidance for future research not to focus on measuring the extent or quantity of disclosure 
but on the variety and complexity of the information communicated. 
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Board monitoring and internal control system disclosure in 
differing regulatory environments 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The internal control system (ICS) is a monitoring mechanism that can help reduce internal and 
external agency costs. According to the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (hereafter CoSO, 1992), an ICS is considered effective when all of its components are 
present and properly functioning. Investors cannot directly observe an ICS in order to appreciate its 
effectiveness because it is composed of internal managerial mechanisms, activities, and processes 
(Cavélius, 2011; Deumes and Knechel, 2008), so disclosure on ICS acts as a monitoring mechanism 
(Craighead et al., 2004) through which investors get specific information on the design and 
implementation of the ICS.  
This paper investigates two research questions: Is ICS disclosure, as a monitoring mechanism, 
associated with the characteristics of the board of directors, particularly the audit committee as the 
main board committee devoted to the effectiveness of ICS? Does the regulatory environment, 
particularly the regulation on ICS disclosure as an external governance/monitoring mechanism play 
a role in shaping the relationship between board monitoring and ICS disclosure and, if so, how?  
While the first research question has been investigated but without specific reference to ICS 
disclosure, the second research question remains almost unexplored. The first research question is 
motivated by previous literature (e.g., Williamson, 1983) that considers both board monitoring and 
ICS disclosures as mechanisms to control and reduce agency conflicts. Williamson (1983) argues 
that, when one mechanism is present, the other is less necessary, suggesting the presence of a 
substitution hypothesis. Moreover, through enforced disclosure, regulators monitor managerial 
decisions on the structure and the functioning of the ICS, thus introducing an additional monitoring 
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system (De Jong et al, 2005; Bianchi et al., 2010). Therefore, we propose that the regulatory 
environment moderates the relationship between board monitoring and ICS disclosure.  
Additionally, we focus on the content of ICS disclosure, which can be either a substantial source of 
information that is useful in supporting investors’ judgment or simply a formal task, depending on 
the information disclosed. Using an ad-hoc disclosure framework that allows us to disentangle the 
mere description of the elements of the ICS (formal disclosure) from the analysis of its effective 
functioning (substantial disclosure), we investigate whether the relationship between ICS disclosure 
and board monitoring in various regulatory settings depends on the content of ICS disclosure 
(formal, uninformative disclosure versus substantial, informative disclosure). Therefore, we 
investigate whether ICS disclosure is important in itself as a monitoring mechanism or whether the 
content determines its importance.  
We study the ICS disclosure of 149 companies listed in four European stock markets (London, 
Paris, Frankfurt, and Milan), each with its own regulations about ICS disclosure, during a six-year 
period (2003–2008). Our findings support an inverse association between the extent of ICS 
disclosure and our proxies for board monitoring and are in line with the substitution hypothesis 
(Williamson, 1983), which argues that the marginal role of any control mechanism depends on its 
relative importance in the governance system of a firm. We also find a statistically significant 
negative relationship between board monitoring and substantial ICS disclosure but no relationship 
between board monitoring and formal ICS disclosure. Our evidence also shows that the regulatory 
environment moderates the relationship between board monitoring and ICS disclosure by 
introducing trade-offs among monitoring mechanisms. In a setting in which ICS disclosure is 
required by law, firms are likely to disclose more information than they are in a setting in which 
ICS disclosure is completely voluntary. In addition, the negative association between ICS disclosure 
and board monitoring is stronger in the former setting than in the latter. This finding is in line with 
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Booth et al. (2002), who find that regulation introduces trade-offs between alternative monitoring 
mechanisms. 
Our paper provides several contributions. First, we propose a framework for the analysis of ICS 
disclosure that considers the informativeness of the content of ICS disclosure, rather than its extent. 
Through this framework, researchers and practitioners can separate boilerplate disclosure from 
substantial disclosure (monitoring function). Second, we provide evidence that the relationship 
between board monitoring and ICS disclosure varies with the content of the information 
communicated, thus offering guidance for future research not to focus on measuring the extent or 
quantity of disclosure but on the variety and complexity of the information communicated. Third, 
we provide evidence in support of the substitution hypothesis, as in Williamson (1983): substantial 
ICS disclosure about its functioning is associated with the strength of other internal monitoring 
mechanisms. Fourth, we provide evidence that the regulatory environment influences the 
relationship between board monitoring and ICS disclosure, so we shed light on how regulation 
interacts with other governance mechanisms (Adams and Ferreira, 2008). Thus, our study has 
policy implications, as we offer an indication for regulators on how and where to address 
management’s discretion in ICS disclosure.  
These features make our research relevant since previous studies have focused either on the US 
setting (the effects of the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; see among others: Ashbaugh et 
al., 2007; Doyle et al., 2007; Leone, 2007; Zhang et al., 2007) or on a single European country (see 
among others: Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Van de Poel and Vanstraelen, 2011). Moreover, 
previous studies on voluntary disclosure of ICS consider only the quantity of information disclosed 
(Abraham and Cox, 2007) or just the presence of this information (Leng and Ding, 2011).  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review of previous research 
and the development of our research hypotheses. We present the research design in section 3, and 
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discuss empirical findings in section 4. Section 5 contains additional analyses, and Section 6 
presents some robustness checks. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
3. Board monitoring, ICS disclosure, and the regulatory environment: hypotheses 
development  
While the introduction of the SOX in the US stimulated a number of studies on the disclosure of 
internal control deficiencies or material weaknesses (among the pioneer works, see Ashbaugh et al., 
2007; Doyle et al., 2007; Leone, 2007; Zhang et al., 2007), only a few studies examine disclosure 
on the characteristics of the ICS1 in the non-SOX setting (Bronson et al., 2006; Abraham and Cox, 
2007; Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Van de Poel and Vanstraelen, 2011; Leng and Ding, 2011). 
These studies have not considered whether the regulatory environment affects the relationship 
between board monitoring and ICS disclosure. Although regulation might act as a substitute for 
board monitoring (Booth et al., 2002), regulators themselves view both disclosure and board 
oversight as important complements to supervision (Adams and Ferreira, 2008; Becher and Frye, 
2011). Therefore, the whether there is any trade-off between alternative monitoring mechanisms 
and the intensity of such trade-offs are empirical questions. 
Previous research grounded in agency theory demonstrates consistently over countries and across 
time that board composition (proportion of independent directors), board leadership (CEO duality), 
and board structure (the role and composition of the audit committee) are good proxies for board 
                                                
1 The disclosure on ICS can focus on the mere description of its elements or can provide information on the adequacy of 
the ICS. With reference to this point, there is a significant difference between the SOX context and the non-SOX 
context, as under the SOX regulation the reporting on ICS is enforced both for the declaration of adequacy and 
disclosure on the effective functioning of internal controls. Both the external auditors and the management undertake 
the declaration of adequacy. In the SOX regulatory environment, in order to be valuable, disclosure on ICS must go 
beyond the description of its characteristics, focusing on the effectiveness of the system in managing internal control 
deficiencies or material weaknesses. This type of disclosure provides investors with relevant information about possible 
shortfalls in the functioning of the ICS (Leone, 2007). The US is a unique context, as disclosure is required to be 
directly associated with the effectiveness of the ICS, whereas in other countries disclosure on ICS does not necessarily 
focus on the effectiveness of the ICS. This difference implies that the extent of disclosure is not necessarily associated 
with its ability to depict the effectiveness of ICS. Nonetheless, disclosure is the main way for external investors to 
gather information on the functioning and effectiveness of ICS. 
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monitoring (see among others: Beasley, 1996; Di Pietra et al., 2008; Bronson et al., 2009; Jaggi et 
al., 2009). This paper shows how these proxies of board monitoring relate to ICS disclosure and 
whether the regulatory environment (the enforcement of ICS disclosure versus the comply-or-
explain approach) plays a role in shaping this relationship. 
Board composition – proportion of independent directors 
The composition of the board is an important factor in ensuring the ability of the board to monitor 
management’s behavior effectively (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Independent directors 
increase the monitoring ability of the board, because they are less likely than internal directors to be 
aligned with management and more inclined to encourage firms to disclose information to 
stakeholders. Nevertheless, research provides mixed empirical results concerning this issue. Using 
indirect measures of disclosure based on analysts’ perceptions, Ho and Wong (2001) find no 
significant relationship between the level of disclosure and board independence, while Eng and Mak 
(2003) and Gul and Leung (2004) show that board independence is negatively associated with 
disclosure, and Chen and Jaggi (2000), Leung and Horwitz (2004) and Cerbioni and Parbonetti 
(2007) find a positive association between the proportion of non-executive directors and firms’ 
disclosure.  
Following agency theory, independent directors should promote disclosure to investors in order to 
communicate that the board is monitoring management properly. Independent directors have 
incentives to provide more ICS disclosure, both to align their behavior to the recommendations of 
the codes of corporate governance and to benefit their reputations for providing sound disclosures to 
the market (Fama and Jensen, 1983). This argumentation leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H1a: ICS disclosure is positively associated with the proportion of independent directors. 
 
Board leadership – role of CEO duality  
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According to Fama and Jensen (1983: 314), CEO duality “signals the absence of separation 
between decision control and decision management.” Carver (1990) asserts that CEO duality makes 
it difficult to have a frank and honest discussion about the performance of the firm, and Jensen 
(1993) argues that it is important to separate the role of CEO and chairman if the board is to be an 
effective monitoring device. Forker (1992) states that combining the role of CEO and chairman 
compromises the system of checks and balances and represents a conflict of interest and a threat to 
the quality of monitoring, finding a significant negative relationship between a dominant CEO 
personality and the quality of stock-option disclosures. As CEO duality weakens the monitoring 
role of the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, in accordance with best practice, enhances 
the monitoring role of the board and by promoting higher levels of ICS disclosure to investors, 
reinforces it. Thus, we develop the following hypothesis: 
H1b: ICS disclosure is negatively associated with CEO duality. 
Board structure – role of audit committee 
Board monitoring depends also on the structure and composition of subcommittees (Xie et al., 
2003), as the most important board decisions are made at that level (Kesner, 1988). Pincus et al. 
(1989) assert that the audit committee enhances the capacity of the board to control management 
because it provides detailed knowledge and understanding of the financial reporting process. 
Beasley and Salterio (2001: 565) show that the audit committee “is embedded in the context of 
broader corporate governance concerns and alternative monitoring mechanisms.” Xie et al. (2003) 
show that audit committee members with financial backgrounds are associated with smaller 
discretionary current accruals, as these members are more able to constrain the propensity of 
managers to engage in earnings management than are those without financial backgrounds. Finally, 
Bronson et al. (2009) find that the benefits of audit committee independence are achieved only 
when the audit committee is completely independent.  
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The monitoring role played by board members is enhanced by the variety and depth of their 
competencies (Krishnan, 2005; Zhang et al., 2007). Accounting expertise is relevant for board 
members not only for evaluating management performance, but also for appreciating the impact of 
accounting procedures and accounting information systems on the reliability of financial reporting. 
Accounting experts on the board also promote the improvement of the ICS toward quality assurance 
of financial reporting. Therefore, we expect that the monitoring role of the audit committee is 
associated with the levels of ICS disclosure because it is so demanded by the codes of corporate 
governance. Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H1c: ICS disclosure is positively associated with the monitoring activity of the audit committee. 
 
The regulatory environment: enforcement vs. comply-or-explain 
The role of disclosure is affected by what the market expects firms to disclose. When the law 
enforces disclosure, regulators limit managerial discretion and its effect on shareholders’ wealth 
(Booth et al. 2002). While the board is responsible for the ICS, the ICS is also monitored by 
regulators through enforced disclosure of its structure and functioning. Thus, the regulation of ICS 
disclosure acts as an additional monitoring mechanism.  
This additional monitoring mechanism could affect firms’ disclosing behavior (Becher and Frye, 
2011) and its relationship with other monitoring mechanisms (Booth et al., 2002). According to 
Becher and Frye (2011), if regulations pressure firms to adopt effective monitoring mechanisms, 
monitoring levels should be higher for regulated firms than for unregulated firms and regulated 
firms should offer more ICS disclosure than unregulated firms. According to Booth et al. (2002), 
since regulation reduces the impact of management discretion on shareholders wealth, ICS 
disclosure may be less essential in controlling potential agency conflicts in an enforced setting than 
in an unregulated setting, all other monitoring mechanisms being equal.  
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While tradeoffs between alternative monitoring mechanisms have been extensively documented 
(Leftwich et al., 1981; Booth et al., 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Fernandez and Arrondo, 2005; 
Ferreira et al., 2011), the monitoring role played by regulation of ICS disclosure and the possible 
consequences for corrective actions could shape the relationship between board monitoring and ICS 
disclosure by introducing tradeoffs between alternative monitoring mechanisms. Similar to board 
monitoring, ICS disclosure and regulation serve to control and reduce agency conflicts and, if one 
mechanism is present, the other might be less necessary (Williamson, 1983). Therefore, we expect 
that the regulatory environment has a moderating effect on the relationship between board 
monitoring and ICS disclosure. Accordingly, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H2: Regulation plays a moderating role in the relationship between board monitoring and ICS 
disclosure. 
 
4. Research design 
4.1 Sample  
We study the ICS disclosures of firms listed in four stock markets (France, Germany, the UK, and 
Italy). French and German regulation requires ICS disclosure, whereas ICS disclosure in the UK 
and Italy is based on a comply-or-explain provision. Our initial sample consists of the forty largest 
firms in each country. Table 1 summarizes the sample selection process and the observations’ 
distribution over the time period analyzed (years 2003–2008).  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2 Measurement of ICS disclosure 
Whereas most corporate governance codes of best practices require ICS disclosure, these codes do 
not define standards on the content of the disclosure, so the decision on what is disclosed relies on 
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management discretion (Appendix 1 presents the disclosure requirements in the four countries 
analyzed in this study). 
Disclosure indices in the literature (Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Van de 
Poel and Vanstraelen, 2011; Leng and Ding, 2011) are built mainly on checklists of items. We 
argue that these indices cannot capture the variety of content that management can disclose on the 
ICS. To overcome this limitation, we propose a framework that captures the variety and complexity 
of the content disclosed through the narratives on ICS. This framework allows the formal disclosure 
on the elements of the ICS and the substantial disclosure on its functioning to be defined separately 
so a sound judgment to be made.  
Our framework is articulated along two dimensions (figure 1). 
  INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The first dimension refers to the seven ICS elements defined by the CoSO framework (CoSO, 
2004): (i) internal environment, (ii) objective-setting and definition of risk appetite/tolerance, (iii) 
risk identification, (iv) risk assessment, (v) action planning, (vi) implementation of action plans, 
(vii) communication and monitoring. The second dimension regards ICS functioning, where 
management provides investors with generic information concerning mainly the objectives of the 
ICS. The type of firm’s objectives classification is taken from the CoSO Framework	  to include: 
efficiency of operations; reliability of financial reporting; compliance with the law; and 
safeguarding of assets. This type of disclosure tends to satisfy the need to meet formal disclosure 
requirements; it is usually undertaken with a “copy and paste” approach from domestic corporate 
governance standards and that is boilerplate information. 
Management can also provide more insights on ICS functioning: which actors are directly involved 
in internal controls, their main roles and duties, the types of control procedures and mechanisms put 
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in place, and how risks are assessed and controls managed. We classify the type of actors as: 
members of the board of directors; members of the audit committee; the internal control supervisor; 
the internal auditor; members of senior management (e.g., CEO, CFO, controller); members of the 
risk committee/risk manager; and others. We classify the type of control procedures and 
mechanisms in: audit committee’s working mechanisms; internal control guidelines and procedures; 
accountability definition; ethical codes/codes of conduct; planning and budgeting; risk reporting; 
information system tools; and other documented activities. This type of disclosure is likely to 
provide useful insights on the implementation of the ICS, that is, substantial information. 
We analyze the ICS disclosures contained in the corporate governance sections of the annual reports 
using content analysis, a methodology widely adopted in disclosure studies. Following 
Krippendorff (2004), we organize data collection in three phases. First, we define the recording 
unit, choosing single sentences as recording units because they are generally considered more 
reliable than pages or paragraphs. Second, we set a procedure to code ICS information, assigning a 
score of 0 if the sentence does not provide information on ICS and 1 if it contains some information 
on ICS. Third, any time a piece of information is identified, it is located into the ICS disclosure 
framework at the intersection of row and column in order to classify each sentence concerning ICS 
by both ICS element and ICS functioning (type of firm’s objectives, type of actors and type of 
control procedures and mechanisms)2.  
                                                
2 The coding was conducted in two time periods. In the first time period (January–May 2008), we coded the years 2003–
–2005, and in the second time period (September–December 2012), we coded the years 2006–2008. Each coding was 
conducted by two research assistants under the supervision of one of the authors. Because the coding activity was 
conducted at two times and with different research assistants, we checked for the robustness of the coding process in 
each period and between the two periods. As for the robustness in each period, on the basis of the evidence collected in 
a pilot test, a list of identification and classification rules was discussed and defined in order to supplement the 
disclosure scheme. After the pilot test, each coder independently classified the Corporate Governance section of the 
annual report into the ICS disclosure framework. To determine the robustness of the coding activity between time 
periods, we asked each research assistant who classified the years 2006––2008 to classify a sample of twenty annual 
reports from 2003–2005. Both research assistants and one of the authors reviewed the results, highlighting the 
differences with the previously conducted coding. Where there were differences between the two classifications, we 
identified the reason for the differences and adopted the criteria used in the first phase of coding. In order to ensure the 
reliability and validity of the data collected, we calculated the Cronbach’s alpha for the coding procedure (Krippendorff, 
2004): the value of 0.84 indicates internal consistency in the coding procedure. Appendix 2 provides an example of the 
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 Each category of disclosure has its own disclosure score, based on the number of sentences that 
contain ICS information related to that category: objectives (O_score), actors (A_score), and control 
procedures and mechanisms (M_score). The Total ICS Disclosure Score (TICSD) is obtained by 
summing the disclosure scores for each category, so it counts the number of sentences containing 
ICS information. We also calculate a Standardized Disclosure Index (ICSD) by dividing TICSD by 
the maximum TICSD obtained in each year across all firms and countries. Table 2 describes the 
disclosure scores. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.3 Measurement of independent variables 
Following other studies on the relationship between board monitoring and disclosure (e.g., Cerbioni 
and Parbonetti, 2007; Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012), data on board monitoring is hand-collected 
from annual reports, which usually contain the name and title of each director (i.e., executive or 
independent director), a description of the director’s role on the board (i.e., membership in a 
committee), and a brief biography. According to extant literature (among others see: Beasley, 1996; 
Bronson et al., 2009; Jaggi et al., 2009), board independence, board leadership, and board structure 
(the monitoring role of the audit committee) are good proxies for board monitoring. Board 
independence (prind) is measured as the proportion of independent directors sitting on the board 
(among others see: Beasley, 1996; Klein, 2002; Dechow et al., 1996; Peasnell et al., 2005)3. CEO 
duality, the proxy for board leadership, and is measured by a dummy variable (duality) that takes 
the value of 1 if the CEO is not the chairman of the board and 0 otherwise. We consider both the 
financial/accounting expertise and the independence of the audit committee in measuring the 
monitoring role of the audit committee (Abbott et al., 2004; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008; 
                                                                                                                                                            
output of the coding process, the disclosure scores obtained, and some examples of coding. 
3 In Germany companies are required to have a two-tier board. Therefore, the percentage of independent directors is 
calculated over the total number of members of both the supervisory and the management boards.  
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Hoitash et al., 2009). Following Zhang et al. (2007), who find that the presence of such expertise 
indicates a high level of monitoring ability, we proxy the presence of the accounting expertise in the 
audit committee with the proportion of financial/accounting experts on the committee 
(ac_expertise). We also consider a dummy variable (ac_expert chair) that takes the value of 1 if the 
chair of the audit committee is an accounting expert and 0 otherwise4. We identify 
financial/accounting experts using the biographical notes for board members in the annual report5 
and measure the audit committee’s degree of independence with a dummy variable (ac_independent 
chair) that takes the value of 1 if the chair of the committee is independent and 0 otherwise.  
Enforcement is measured by a dummy variable (enf) that equals 1 if the firm is listed in a market 
where ICS disclosure is mandatory—an enforced setting, as in France and Germany—and 0 if the 
firm is listed in a market where ICS disclosure is voluntary—a comply-or-explain setting, as in Italy 
and the UK. 
 
4.4 Measurement of control variables 
We select control variables on the basis of prior studies on corporate disclosure. Data are collected 
using Datastream. Following Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) we control for firm’s size, measured as 
the logarithm of total sales (size) and profitability, measured as return on equity (prof). We use 
market-to-book value of equity (mtb) as a control for the level of information asymmetry (Eng and 
Mak, 2003). Because of the strong enforcement provided by SOX, we also control for cross-listing 
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) (Gul and Leung, 2004). We measure cross-listing with a 
dummy variable (xlist) that equals 1 if the firm is listed on the NYSE and 0 otherwise. We use the 
                                                
4 Following previous literature (Abbot et al., 2004; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008; Hoitash et al., 2009), we originally 
planned to use the size of the audit committee as a proxy for its monitoring ability, but there was insufficient variability 
in the sample to do so since the vast majority of the firms has an audit committee of three members.  
5 A board member is classified as an accounting expert when he/she has a professional (e.g., CPA) or academic 
certification, has professional experience in supervising the financial function (e.g., CEO, CFO), or is a user of financial 
information (e.g., financial analysts, venture capitalists, investment bankers). 
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number of analyst estimates (analyst estimates) to control for the level of scrutiny of and the 
attention of the capital market to the disclosing firm. We also control for other board characteristics 
that may affect the level of monitoring: we employ the square of board size (bsizesq) and the 
frequency of board meetings (board meetings). Furthermore, we consider controls describing the 
ownership structure (Garcìa-Meca and Sànchez-Ballesta, 2010; Abraham and Cox, 2007): the 
proportion of shares held by the largest investor (largest). Finally, we control for the impact of 
financial industry regulation (financial) on disclosure (Booth et al., 2002). Table 3 lists all 
independent and control variables6.  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Descriptive and univariate analyses 
Table 4 Panel A presents descriptive statistics on ICS disclosure. On average, firms disclose 45 
items of information on ICS (TICSD), most of which refers to control procedures and mechanisms 
(M_score), with a mean of 36.3 items. Relatively less information relates to objectives (O_score), 
which has a mean of 5.7 items, and actors (A_score), with a mean of 3.7 items. This first descriptive 
evidence suggests that the majority of the ICS disclosure regards the ICS functioning since most of 
the items refer to how procedures and mechanisms are put in place and how they work. Therefore, 
firms give priority to substantial information over formal, boilerplate, descriptive ICS disclosure. 
Table 4 Panel A contains descriptive statistics on ICS disclosure in enforced and in comply-or-
explain settings. Firms in enforced settings are likely to disclose more ICS information than those in 
the comply-or-explain setting, with means (medians) of the total disclosure scores (TICSD) 62.4 
(52) and 27.7 (23), respectively.  
                                                
6 We do not control for type of auditor (Big 4) because of the limited variation in this variable across the sample. 
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Table 4 Panel B presents the distribution of disclosure across objectives, actors, and control 
procedures and mechanisms. Results confirm that disclosure focuses on control procedures and 
mechanisms (79.56% of the disclosure), while objectives (12.38%) and actors (8.06%) deserve 
marginal attention. The concentration of disclosure (Table 4, Panel B) on control procedures and 
mechanisms is higher in the enforced (84.57% for France and 80.87% for Germany) setting than in 
the comply-or-explain setting, where firms devote more attention to simply describing ICS 
objectives (23.34% and 18.28% of disclosure on control procedures and mechanisms in the UK and 
Italy, respectively).  
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The ICS disclosure differs in the two regulatory environments. Looking at the overall disclosure 
index (TICSD) and at its sub-indexes (O_score, A_score, M_score) we find differences both in the 
extent and in the content of information disclosed (Table 5). All differences for the disclosure 
indices are statistically significant at 1% (one-tailed). All disclosures but the ICS objectives 
(O_score) are significantly greater for firms in enforced settings than for those in comply-or-explain 
settings. Disclosures on ICS objectives are usually generic information on the overall design and 
aims of the ICS, often “copy and paste” quotations from well-known frameworks (like CoSO) or 
from domestic corporate governance codes. This evidence shows that firms in enforced settings are 
likely to have more ICS disclosures than those in comply-or-explain settings, which is in line with 
the regulation pressure argument, according to which regulated firms provide greater ICS disclosure 
and more substantial disclosure about ICS control procedures and mechanisms than unregulated 
firms do. We find opposite evidence in the comply-or-explain setting, where disclosure tends to be 
vague and less useful since it refers primarily to ICS objectives.  
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
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Table 6 contains the main descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix. The negative correlations 
(or lack of correlations) between ICS disclosure and our board monitoring measures indicate that 
management has fewer incentives for ICS disclosure when the level of monitoring is high. In line 
with univariate results, we find a significant and positive correlation between disclosure and the 
level of regulation (enf). Results of the correlation analysis between the ICS disclosure and control 
variables are consistent with previous research.  
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
5.2 Multivariate analysis 
We specify a panel-corrected standard error model, assuming within-unit homoskedasticity, because 
we find different error variances for the different cross-sections, and with such cross-section 
heteroskedasticity, the OLS standard errors are inconsistent. 
In order to test our hypotheses, the following panel regression model (with industry fixed effects) is 
specified:   
   
where: 
DISC         TICSD: Total ICS disclosure index   
prindit Proportion of independent directors on the Board of Directors 
dualityit Dummy equal to 1 if CEO is not the chairman and 0 otherwise 
ac_expertiseit Proportion of accounting experts on the Audit Committee (AC) 
ac_independent chairit Dummy equal to 1 if the chair of the AC is independent and 0 otherwise 
ac_expert chairit Dummy equal to 1 if the chair of the AC is an accounting expert and 0 otherwise 
enfi Dummy equal to 1 if the firm is listed in France or in Germany and 0 otherwise 
Controls: 
sizeit Log of total sales 
profit Return on equity 
mtbit Market-to-book value of equity 
xlistit Dummy equal to1 if the firm is cross-listed at the NYSE and 0 otherwise 
analyst estimates Number of analyst estimates 
bsizesqit (Number of board members)2 
board meetings Number of board meetings each year 
largestit Percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders 
i           The firm 
t           The year 
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Table 7 contains the results of our regression models. In considering the full sample, Model (1) 
finds mixed results about the relationship between ICS disclosure and board monitoring 
(Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c) but clear evidence about the moderating role of the regulatory 
environment on the relationship between board monitoring and ICS disclosure (Hypothesis 2).  
If we consider the base effect of our proxies of board monitoring, we find that only CEO non-
duality (duality) has a strong negative association with the level of ICS disclosure (i.e., when the 
CEO is not also the chairman of the board, the firm discloses less information on the ICS). The 
independence of the audit committee (ac_independent chair) has a weak negative relationship with 
ICS disclosure. If we consider the financial/accounting expertise on the audit committee, only the 
professional characteristics of the chairperson (ac_expert chair) are associated with ICS disclosure: 
when the chair is a professional expert, the ICS disclosure is higher (although the relationship is 
weak, as it is statistically significant only at 10%), while the percentage of financial/accounting 
experts on the audit committee is not associated with ICS disclosure.  
We find that firms in an enforced setting are likely to disclose more information than are firms in 
comply-or-explain settings, as the coefficient for enf is positive and strongly statistically significant. 
Second, we find that all of the interaction terms between enforcement and our proxies for 
monitoring (except CEO duality) are strongly negatively associated with ICS. Enforcement has the 
effect of increasing the extent of ICS information disclosed, although this effect is not the same for 
all firms. Our results show that, when firms have strong monitoring, the need to disclose 
information on the ICS is lower. In particular, in an enforced setting, the stronger the monitoring 
role played by independent directors, the lower is the need to disclose ICS information to the 
market. The coefficient of duality is negative and significant, while the coefficient for enf*duality is 
negative but not significant, indicating that CEO non-duality relates negatively to board monitoring 
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and that this relationship is not affected by the regulatory environment. The coefficient of 
ac_expertise is positive but statistically not significant, while the coefficient for enf*ac_expertise is 
negative and significant, suggesting that this relationship depends on the regulatory environment. 
We find a negative coefficient for ac_independent chair that is only marginally significant (10%) 
and a negative and highly significant coefficient for enf*ac_independent chair, suggesting that the 
relationship between ICS disclosure and the independence of the audit committee depends heavily 
on the regulatory environment. Finally, the coefficient of ac_expert chair is positive and marginally 
significant, while its interaction with the regulatory environment (enf*ac_expert chair) is negative, 
greater in absolute value, and highly significant, suggesting that the level of ICS disclosure is lower 
when an accounting expert chairs the audit committee in an enforced setting.  
Overall, we do not find support for a positive association between board monitoring and ICS 
disclosure, although our evidence points to a substitution effect between alternative monitoring 
mechanisms (Williamson, 1983) and that the regulatory environment plays a moderating role 
between board monitoring and ICS disclosure. 
In order to investigate in more detail the relationship between board monitoring and ICS disclosure, 
we run Model (1) separately in the enforced and the comply-or-explain settings (Models (2) and (3), 
respectively). Results of Model (2) support a clear, significant, and negative relationship between 
ICS disclosure and our proxies for board monitoring. The negative coefficient of prind suggests that 
the monitoring role played by independent directors is a substitute for ICS disclosure. The 
coefficient for duality is significant and negative, confirming that, firms with CEO duality in an 
enforced environment are more likely to disclose more information on the ICS than are firms with 
separation between CEO and Chairman. Our results also provide evidence of a substitution effect 
between ICS disclosure and the monitoring ability of the audit committee, as measured by the 
proportion of accounting experts (ac_expertise) and the independence (ac_independent chair) and 
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expertise (ac_expert chair) of the chair of the audit committee. In the enforced setting, the 
substitution effect between board monitoring and ICS disclosure is clear: where the level of 
monitoring is high, the need to disclose ICS information is lower (or the demand coming from the 
market about this information is lower) than when the level of monitoring is low. Results from 
Model (3), which refers only to the comply-or-explain setting, support a weak association between 
board monitoring and ICS disclosure. In particular, three of our five proxies for board monitoring 
are related to ICS disclosure, although the signs of the coefficients vary. We find a negative and 
significant coefficient for CEO non-duality (duality) and independence of the chair of the audit 
committee (ac_independent chair), suggesting that board monitoring substitutes for ICS disclosure 
even in a comply-or-explain setting. Nevertheless, we find that, when the chair of the audit 
committee is an accounting expert, the chair’s monitoring expertise is greater and he or she is more 
likely to promote ICS disclosure than when the chair is not an accounting expert. In the comply-or-
explain setting, we do not find empirical evidence of a relationship between ICS disclosure and the 
proportion of independent directors or the proportion of accounting experts on the audit committee.  
 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
Given this mixed evidence, we investigate next whether the relationship between ICS disclosure 
and board monitoring in differing regulatory settings is driven by the characteristics of ICS 
disclosure (formal, uninformative disclosure versus substantial, informative disclosure). 
 
6. Additional analyses 
We perform the model shown in equation (1), using as dependent variables the scores related to the 
content of ICS disclosure: objectives (O_score), actors (A_score), and control procedures and 
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mechanisms (M_score) (Table 8: Models (1), (4) and (7)). We also analyze these relationships 
separately in the enforced setting (Table 8: Models (2), (5) and (8)) and in the comply-or-explain 
setting (Table 8: Models (3), (6) and (9)). 
 
 INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
We obtain results similar to the main analysis when we focus on the disclosure of control 
procedures and mechanisms (M_score). However, some relevant differences emerge related to the 
relationship between board monitoring and disclosure on the objectives and on the actors of the 
ICS. In a comply-or-explain setting, the proportion of independent directors (prind) is positively 
and significantly associated with disclosure on both objectives (O_score) and actors (A_score), 
while in an enforced setting the corresponding coefficients are negative and significant. This 
evidence points to a formal use of disclosure in a comply-or-explain setting. In such a setting, 
boards with a high proportion of independent directors appear to promote the disclosure of formal 
aspects of ICS (as captured by O_score and A_score) but not the more substantial aspects of ICS 
(as captured by the M_score). In some ways, disclosure seems to be aligned to the formal 
requirements of corporate governance codes, which are frequently reflected in the corporate 
governance section of the annual report. It is typical of corporate governance codes to avoid 
detailed descriptions concerning how the organization functions (e.g., control procedures and 
mechanisms and processes), as such functions are idiosyncratic to any company. However, special 
emphasis is typically given to the aims (i.e., objectives) and accountability (i.e., actors and 
responsibilities) aspects of corporate governance. Therefore, the disclosure behavior of independent 
board members may be seen as a consequence of the “comply” philosophy: ICS disclosure is 
shaped in accordance with the emphasis on objectives and actors set by corporate governance 
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codes. A consequence of this phenomenon is the poverty of the disclosure on the ICS functioning, 
which leads to widespread superficiality of disclosure that, while formally complying with 
corporate governance requirements, contains little “meaningful, high-level information” (Spira and 
Page, 2010). This point has policy implications that are discussed in the concluding paragraph.  
Taken together, our analyses suggest that there is a substitution relationship in enforced settings 
between board monitoring and ICS disclosure that is stronger when disclosure contains information 
on the types of control procedures implemented and on how risks and controls are assessed and 
managed than when disclosure is focused only on description of the elements of the ICS. In other 
words, strong monitoring by the board counterbalances the role of substantial ICS information, 
upon which investors can base their appreciation of how well the ICS is functioning. However, 
evidence is mixed in a comply-or-explain setting, where we find that board monitoring proxies do a 
better job of explaining the disclosure of formal elements of the ICS, rather than its substantial 
aspects, although alternative measures of board monitoring seem to have opposite effects on 
disclosure. The point has policy implications that are discussed in the concluding paragraph.  
 
7. Robustness analyses7  
Endogeneity issue  
Our results may suffer from endogeneity problems as a result of omitted variables that can affect 
both the dependent and the independent variables. We thus perform a three-stage least square 
regression model using two simultaneous equations. The first equation (A) shows the effect of the 
proportion of independent directors on the total disclosure index (TICSD), while the second 
equation (B) tests the effect of the disclosure index on the proportion of independent directors 
(prind). The result of this analysis supports our main findings.  
                                                
7 For sake of brevity we do not present tables on robustness analyses, but they are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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Country differences within the regulatory setting 
Our results could be driven by the differences between the two countries we analyzed in each 
regulatory environment. To address this concern, we perform two robustness tests. The first test 
runs the model in equation (1) with country fixed effects. Untabulated results show similar results 
as our main analysis for firms in the enforced setting, while in the comply-or-explain setting the 
coefficients for CEO duality and the independence and expertise of the audit committee chair are 
not significantly different from zero.  
Our second test runs the model in equation (1) and adds to the explanatory variables the Kauffman’s 
rule of law measure and its interaction with board-monitoring proxies. This variable, which 
considers differences in the legal enforcement across countries, is measured at country level and 
represents the “perception of the extent to which agents have confidence in […] the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts” (Kaufmann et al., 2009: 9). The 
evidence from this robustness test is similar to that obtained using country fixed effects. 
 
Other proxies for control variables 
We measure size as the logarithm of sales, market value, and total assets and employ ROA as an 
alternative measure of performance. We use the number of independent directors instead of the 
proportion of independent directors and the number, rather than the proportion, of accounting 
experts on the audit committee. In all cases results remain unchanged. Following Bronson et al. 
(2009), we use as a proxy for the monitoring ability of the audit committee the proportion of 
independent directors sitting on the audit committee and on a fully independent committee. We find 
similar results. Statistical associations hold when we use the standardized ICS disclosure index 
instead of the total score. We also control for cross listing other than on the NYSE, and results are 
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not affected. 
 
8. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper investigates the relationship between board monitoring and ICS disclosure. First, we find 
that firms in enforced settings are likely to disclose more information on internal controls than are 
firms in comply-or-explain settings. Moreover, the intensity of this effect is inversely related to the 
strength of board monitoring: firms where board monitoring is stronger are less likely to disclose 
information about their ICS than are firms where board monitoring is weak. In an enforced setting, 
results support a clear, significant substitution effect between board monitoring and ICS disclosure. 
On the other hand, our results do not support a strong association between board monitoring and 
ICS disclosure in a comply-or-explain environment. Furthermore, our findings support the 
moderating role of the regulatory environment between board monitoring and ICS disclosure.  
In order to clarify the disclosure strategies that firms in comply-or-explain settings adopt, we moved 
from our original disclosure score (measuring the extent of disclosure) to a new measurement 
system that distinguishes among the types of disclosure content provided about ICS, separating 
formal disclosure (offering only descriptions of ICS elements) from substantial disclosure (offering 
information on ICS functioning).  
Our evidence has two major policy implications. The first addresses the role of disclosure in 
enforced settings. While it is commonly accepted that disclosure on governance mechanisms is 
positively associated with board monitoring, our empirical evidence suggests that this truism does 
not apply in all settings. In fact, when disclosure on the characteristics of the ICS is enforced, board 
monitoring is negatively associated with the level of disclosure, confirming the presence of a 
substitution effect between alternative monitoring mechanisms (Williamson, 1983; Booth et al., 
2002). Since the purpose of both board monitoring and ICS disclosure is controlling and reducing 
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agency conflicts, our results suggest that the presence of an additional mechanism for controlling 
and reducing agency conflicts (regulation of ICS disclosure) renders the others (board monitoring) 
less essential. 
The second implication concerns the role and principles of disclosure in comply-or-explain settings. 
Public consultations on the effectiveness of disclosures on ICS in comply-or-explain settings (FRC, 
2005; FRC, 2009) have demonstrated that, while market participants repeatedly express strong 
preferences for retaining the current approach of “soft law” underpinned by some regulation, rather 
than moving to one more reliant on legislation and regulation, at the same time “both companies 
and investors have expressed reservations about the way in which comply-or-explain works in 
practice and it is clear that more needs to be done to encourage all parties to apply it in the intended 
manner” (FRC, 2009). Our analysis on the content of ICS disclosures in comply-or-explain settings 
explains the partial dissatisfaction of disclosers and validates on a larger scale the results of 
previous studies that have testified to the superficiality of disclosures that only formally comply 
with the recommendations of codes of corporate governance (and their companion guidance) but 
contain little “meaningful, high-level information” (Spira and Page, 2010).  This poverty of 
disclosure can be explained by the drift toward the communication of formal elements induced by 
the comply approach. It can also be interpreted as opening the door to further discussions with 
investors outside the legal and literary constraints of narrative disclosure. Narrative disclosure 
included in public statements is subject to litigation risk, so it tends to use standard terms and 
conditions, as disclosers may consider any use of non-standard statements ambiguous and 
distracting (Ahdieh, 2006): it is a short step from standard wording to boilerplate disclosure. With 
regard to literary constraints, an additional detailed disclosure of ICS mechanisms in an annual 
report’s corporate governance section might conflict with investors’ (and regulators’) requests for 
limited amounts of information as a reaction to the uncontrolled growth of the (variously useful) 
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information in annual reports. Therefore, full disclosure of internal control mechanisms may be 
made outside the corporate governance section of the annual report. Nonetheless, in order to be 
effective, ICS disclosures in public documents must at least highlight the key aspects of their 
implementation and functioning and act at the same time as a checklist and an agenda for further 
discussion.  
In conclusion, future regulations, as well as consultations preliminary to revising the guidance for 
implementation of an effective ICS, should consider carefully the issue of its disclosure, taking into 
account both the content of the disclosure (considering formal and substantial disclosure) and the 
interactions between ICS disclosure (both formal and substantial) and board monitoring 
mechanisms.  
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Figure 1 – ICS Disclosure Framework 
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Table 1. Sample Selection 
TABLE 1 
Sample Selection and Distribution 
              
Initial sample  960    Year Freq. Percent Cum. 
minus             
Missing observations on disclosure (reports not available)  48    2003 148 17.07 17.07 
Missing observations on governance  22    2004 148 17.07 34.14 
Missing observations on control variables  23    2005 148 17.07 51.21 
      2006 143 16.49 67.70 
Total firm-years  867    2007 141 16.26 83.97 
Unique firms  149    2008 139 16.03 100.00 
              
      Total 867 100   
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Table 2. Definition of Disclosure variables 
 Variable Description  Measure 
O_scoreit Total disclosure score on ICS objectives 
€ 
ICS_Oij
j=1
k
∑ ,  
where  
ICS_Oij= 1 if sentence contains information on ICS objectives  
K= n. of sentences  
A_scoreit Total disclosure score on ICS actors 
€ 
ICS_ Aij
j=1
k
∑ ,  
where  
ICS_Aij= 1 if sentence contains information on ICS actors  
K= n. of sentences 
M_scoreit Total disclosure score on ICS mechanisms 
€ 
ICS_Mij
j=1
k
∑ ,  
where  
ICS_Mij= 1 if sentence contains information on ICS mechanisms  
K= n. of sentences 
TICSDit Total ICS disclosure score O_scoreit + A_scoreit + M_scoreit 
ICSDit Standardized ICS disclosure index 
€ 
TICSDit /maxi (TICSDit ) 
 
Table 3. Definition of independent and control variables 
   Variable Description  Measure 
Board 
monitoring 
prindit Board independence Proportion of independent directors on BoD 
dualityit Ceo (non) duality 
Dummy equal to 1 if CEO is not the chairman; 0 
otherwise 
ac_expertise Board expertise Proportion of accounting experts in AC 
ac_independent 
chair AC independence 
Dummy equal to 1 if Chair of the AC is independent; 0 
otherwise 
ac_expert chair AC expertise Dummy equal to 1 if Chair of the AC is an accounting expert; 0 otherwise 
Enforcement enfi 
Enforcement of ICS 
disclosure 
Dummy equal to 1 if firm is listed in France or in 
Germany; 0 otherwise 
Controls sizeit Size Log of total sales 
 profit Profitability Return on Equity 
 mtbit Information asymmetry Market to book value of equity 
 xlistit Cross listing 
Dummy equal to1 if firm is cross-listed at the NYSE; 0 
otherwise 
 analyst estimates Level of scrutiny by the financial market Number of earnings forecasts issued by financial analysts 
 bsizesqit Board Size (n. of board members)2 
 board meetings Board processes n. of board meetings each year 
 largestit 
Ownership 
concentration Percentage of shares held by largest shareholders 
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Table 4. Panel A. Descriptive statistics for disclosure measures 
Disclosure measures N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
A
ll 
TICSD 867 45.729 41.296 0 14 31 70 179 
O_score 867 5.661 4.691 0 2 5 8 26 
A_score 867 3.684 4.153 0 0 2 6 21 
M_score 867 36.384 35.913 0 10 23 55 154 
C
om
pl
y-
or
-
ex
pl
ai
n 
TICSD 415 27.627 25.324 0 10 23 39 128 
O_score 415 5.687 5.037 0 2 5 8 26 
A_score 415 2.586 3.182 0 0 2 4 17 
M_score 415 19.354 18.945 0 6 15 28 101 
En
fo
rc
em
en
t TICSD 452 62.350 45.907 0 21 52 102 179 
O_score 452 5.637 4.354 0 2 5 8 22 
A_score 452 4.692 4.658 0 1 3 7 21 
M_score 452 52.020 40.437 0 15 43 87 154 
  
Table 4. Panel B. Concentration of disclosure  
    Enforcement Comply-or-explain 
  Panel France Germany Italy UK 
Objectives 12.38% 8.10% 11.16% 18.28% 23.34% 
Actors 8.06% 7.33% 7.97% 10.16% 8.41% 
Mechanisms 79.56% 84.57% 80.87% 71.57% 68.25% 
   
TICSD Total ICS disclosure score   
O_score Total disclosure about ICS objectives 
A_score Total disclosure about ICS actors   
M_score Total disclosure about ICS mechanisms 
 
Table 5. Univariate Analysis  
 
Disclosure 
means Enforcement (n=452) Comply-or-explain  (n=415) t-test p-value 
TICSD 62.35 27.63 13.62 (p<0.000) 
O_score 5.64 5.69 -0.16 (p>0.10) 
A_score 4.69 2.59 7.71 (p<0.000) 
M_score 52.02 19.35 15.01 (p<0.000) 
 
TICSD Total ICS disclosure score   
O_score Total disclosure about ICS objectives 
A_score Total disclosure about ICS actors   
M_score Total disclosure about ICS mechanisms 
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics and Correlations: Disclosure scores, Independent and Control variables+ 
 
 
    mean sd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 TICSD 45.729 41.296 1               
2 prind 0.603 0.170 -0.262*** 1              
3 duality 0.618 0.486 -0.309*** 0.193*** 1             
4 ac_expertise 0.197 0.207 -0.033 0.079* -0.113*** 1            
5 ac_independent chair 0.866 0.341 -0.392*** 0.302*** 0.270*** -0.076* 1           
6 ac_expert chair 0.354 0.479 0.023 0.241*** -0.034 0.029 0.121*** 1          
7 enf 0.521 0.500 0.420*** -0.052 -0.206*** 0.101** -0.146*** 0.323*** 1         
8 size 10.897 1.577 0.082* 0.097** -0.022 0.091** -0.028 0.035 0.03 1        
9 prof 0.006 3.280 0.021 0.001 0.021 -0.032 -0.012 -0.072* -0.057 -0.028 1       
10 mtb 3.753 26.116 -0.011 -0.001 0.042 0.024 0.026 0.029 0.008 0.003 -0.766*** 1      
11 xlist 0.220 0.415 0.042 0.124*** 0.022 0.005 0.078* -0.033 -0.087* 0.234*** 0.04 0.018 1     
12 analyst estimates 116.183 54.834 0.150*** 0.117*** 0.001 0.124*** 0.068* 0.132*** 0.322*** 0.302*** 0.002 -0.022 0.391*** 1    
13 bsizesq 238.425 126.487 -0.064 -0.005 -0.209*** 0.192*** -0.042 0.141*** 0.206*** 0.426*** 0.045 -0.069* -0.014 0.192*** 1   
14 board meetings 2.953 0.387 0.013 0.159*** 0.045 -0.061 0.032 -0.041 -0.416*** 0.277*** -0.057 0.039 0.186*** 0.023 -0.009 1  
15 largest 0.214 0.192 0.079* -0.205*** -0.170*** -0.006 -0.104** 0.065 0.000 -0.148*** 0.031 -0.03 -0.156*** -0.238*** 0.034 -0.029 1 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  
Variables are defined as follows:  TICSD: Total ICS disclosure score;  prindit: Proportion of independent directors on BoD;  dualityit: Dummy equal to 1 if CEO is not the 
chairman, 0 otherwise;  ac_expertise: Proportion of accounting experts in AC;  ac_independent chair: Dummy equal to 1 if Chair of the AC is independent, 0 otherwise;  
ac_expert chair: Dummy equal to 1 if Chair of the AC is an accounting expert, 0 otherwise;   enfi: Dummy equal to 1 if firm is listed in France or in Germany, 0 otherwise;  
sizeit: Log of total sales;  profit: Return on Equity;  mtbit: Market to book value of equity;  xlistit: Dummy equal to1 if firm is cross-listed at the NYSE, 0 otherwise;  analyst 
estimates: Number of earnings forecasts issued by financial analysts;  bsizesqit: (n. of board members)2;  board meetings: n. of board meetings each year;  largestit: 
Percentage of shares held by largest shareholders  
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Table 7. Panel Corrected Standard Error Models 
TICSD Model (1): Panel Model (2) : Enforcement Model (3): Comply or explain 
prind -10.279 -79.994*** 6.183 
  [0.189] [0.000] [0.421] 
duality -10.998*** -14.628*** -9.623** 
  [0.002] [0.000] [0.019] 
ac_expertise 6.858 -15.272** -0.481 
  [0.295] [0.017] [0.946] 
ac_independent chair -9.965* -28.030*** -11.535* 
  [0.067] [0.000] [0.100] 
ac_expert chair 6.631* -7.063** 8.289** 
  [0.057] [0.014] [0.014] 
enf 110.170***     
  [0.000]     
enf*prind -70.699***     
  [0.000]     
enf*duality -0.787     
  [0.871]     
enf*ac_expertise -30.349***     
  [0.001]     
enf*ac_independent chair -22.783***     
  [0.001]     
enf*ac_expert chair -12.251***     
  [0.005]     
size 10.079*** 14.675*** 8.781*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
prof 1.750*** 1.934*** 0.309 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.954] 
mtb 0.144*** 0.154*** 0.098 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.740] 
xlist -3.235 -6.927 0.479 
  [0.212] [0.117] [0.881] 
analyst estimates -0.023 0.035 -0.015 
  [0.379] [0.362] [0.685] 
bsizesq -0.053*** -0.101*** -0.002 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.899] 
board meetings 19.942*** 22.314*** 10.413** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.029] 
largest 10.369* 23.289*** 13.769 
  [0.083] [0.005] [0.215] 
Constant -122.081*** -99.387*** -96.869*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Industry effects YES YES YES 
Observations 867 452 415 
R-squared 0.637 0.724 0.238 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Variables are defined in Table 2 and Table 3 
 
 
 
37 
 
Variables are defined as follows:  TICSD: Total ICS disclosure score;  prindit: Proportion of 
independent directors on BoD;  dualityit: Dummy equal to 1 if CEO is not the chairman, 0 otherwise;  
ac_expertise: Proportion of accounting experts in AC;  ac_independent chair: Dummy equal to 1 if 
Chair of the AC is independent, 0 otherwise;  ac_expert chair: Dummy equal to 1 if Chair of the AC is 
an accounting expert, 0 otherwise;   enfi: Dummy equal to 1 if firm is listed in France or in 
Germany, 0 otherwise;  sizeit: Log of total sales;  profit: Return on Equity;  mtbit: Market to book value 
of equity;  xlistit: Dummy equal to1 if firm is cross-listed at the NYSE, 0 otherwise;  analyst estimates: 
Number of earnings forecasts issued by financial analysts;  bsizesqit: (n. of board members)2;  board 
meetings: n. of board meetings each year;  largestit: Percentage of shares held by largest shareholders  
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Table 8. Panel Corrected Standard Error Models 
  Disclosure on ICS objectives (O_score) Disclosure on ICS actors (A_score) Disclosure on ICS mechanisms (M_score) 
  
Panel  
(1) 
Enforcement 
(2) 
Comply-or-
explain (3) 
Panel  
(4) 
Enforcement 
(5) 
Comply-or-
explain (6) 
Panel  
(7) 
Enforcement 
(8) 
Comply-or-
explain (9) 
prind 0.535 -5.330*** 3.037* -0.419 -3.454** 1.611* -10.395* -71.210*** 1.535 
  [0.707] [0.000] [0.055] [0.662] [0.011] [0.070] [0.093] [0.000] [0.792] 
duality -1.518** -0.438 -1.625** -1.791*** -0.961** -1.466*** -7.689*** -13.229*** -6.532** 
  [0.018] [0.328] [0.040] [0.000] [0.026] [0.002] [0.005] [0.000] [0.035] 
ac_expertise -1.220 0.311 -1.966 -0.202 -1.748* -0.637 8.281 -13.836** 2.122 
  [0.298] [0.722] [0.122] [0.792] [0.074] [0.416] [0.110] [0.019] [0.702] 
ac_independent chair -0.836 -2.195*** -1.574 -0.878 -0.597 -1.705*** -8.252* -25.237*** -8.256 
  [0.378] [0.000] [0.185] [0.107] [0.306] [0.006] [0.066] [0.000] [0.145] 
ac_expert chair 1.119* -0.205 0.939 1.171*** -1.060** 1.421*** 4.341 -5.799** 5.929** 
  [0.075] [0.603] [0.144] [0.007] [0.011] [0.000] [0.105] [0.026] [0.021] 
enf 3.592**     5.177***     101.401***     
  [0.012]     [0.000]     [0.000]     
enf*prind -5.224***     -4.212**     -61.263***     
  [0.009]     [0.010]     [0.000]     
enf*duality 1.101     1.220*     -3.108     
  [0.171]     [0.051]     [0.444]     
enf*ac_expertise 0.744     -2.648**     -28.445***     
  [0.625]     [0.029]     [0.000]     
enf*ac_independent chair -1.792     -0.060     -20.931***     
  [0.112]     [0.942]     [0.000]     
enf*ac_expert chair -1.206*     -1.647***     -9.398***     
  [0.093]     [0.005]     [0.009]     
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 867 452 415 867 452 415 867 452 415 
R-squared 0.253 0.423 0.230 0.378 0.437 0.341 0.659 0.712 0.215 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Variables are defined as follows:  TICSD: Total ICS disclosure score;  prindit: Proportion of independent directors on BoD;  dualityit: Dummy equal to 1 if CEO is not the 
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chairman, 0 otherwise;  ac_expertise: Proportion of accounting experts in AC;  ac_independent chair: Dummy equal to 1 if Chair of the AC is independent, 0 otherwise;  
ac_expert chair: Dummy equal to 1 if Chair of the AC is an accounting expert, 0 otherwise;   enfi: Dummy equal to 1 if firm is listed in France or in Germany, 0 otherwise;  
sizeit: Log of total sales;  profit: Return on Equity;  mtbit: Market to book value of equity;  xlistit: Dummy equal to1 if firm is cross-listed at the NYSE, 0 otherwise;  analyst 
estimates: Number of earnings forecasts issued by financial analysts;  bsizesqit: (n. of board members)2;  board meetings: n. of board meetings each year;  largestit: 
Percentage of shares held by largest shareholders  
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Appendix 1 - Regulatory settings in analyzed European countries  
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Appendix 2  - Measurement of ICS disclosure 
 
 
ICS Disclosure Scores (example) 
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Examples of coding  
 
 
